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Abstract
In this paper, we study a game with positive or plus infinite expectation and
determine the optimal proportion of investment for maximizing the limit expectation
of growth rate per attempt. With this objective, we introduce a new pricing method
in which the price is different from that obtained by the Black-Scholes formula for
a European option.
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1. Introduction
The portfolio pricing equation (Luenberger (1998) 9.7) is useful for determining
prices only if the optimal portfolio is already known. In this paper, we determine
both the price and optimal proportion of investment for any effective game (Section
6).
The determination of the utility function is more experimental than mathematical.
In general, despite the equality (Πnj=1Xj)
1/n = exp(Σnj=1 logXj/n), the two expectations
E[(Πnj=1Xj)
1/n] and exp(E[Σnj=1 logXj/n]) are not equal for a sequence of independent
random variables {Xj > 0 | j = 1, 2, · · · , n}. Therefore, we use neither the notion
of utility from consumption nor the law of large numbers (Luenberger (1998) 15.2).
The investor should repeatedly invest a fixed proportion of his or her own
current capital without borrowing. As a rule, if the investor invests 1 dollar, then
he or she receives a(x) dollars (including the invested 1 dollar) with a distribution
function F (x) defined on an interval I. For simplicity, we omit the currency
notation. Let M > 0 be the investor’s capital, u > 0 the price of the game,
and 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 the proportion of investment. Then, after one attempt, he or she has
capital of Mta(x)/u +M(1 − t) if x occurs. It should be noted that the reserved
part M(1 − t) does not include the interest, that is the custom, for example, in
foreign exchange accounts.
Let Mn > 0 be the capital after n attempts. In general, growth rate implies
Mn+1/Mn − 1 or log(Mn+1/Mn) after one attempt. However, for the purposes of
succinctness in this paper Mn+1/Mn is used to define the growth rate. In this
context, the growth rate per attempt is defined as (Mn/M0)
1
n .
Without dealing with (Mn/M0)
1
n directly, this paper defines a double sequence
of random variables {XN,n} with respect to the bounded step functions {fN(x)}
such that limN→+∞ fN (x) = a(x) (Section 5). It is shown that the finite limit
limn→+∞
N→+∞
E[XN,n] exists if, and only if, the game is effective. In this case, the
equalities limn→+∞
N→+∞
E[XN,n] = Gu(t) := exp(
∫
I
log(a(x)t/u − t + 1)d(F (x))) and
1
2limn→+∞
N→+∞
V [XN,n] = 0 are obtained. These equalities again support the well-known
assertion that although in principle an investor may choose any utility function,
a repetitive situation tends to hammer the utility into one that is close to the
logarithm (Luenberger (1998) 15.4, Kelly (1956)).
We study the optimal proportion of investment, tu, for the price u > 0 in
order to maximize the limit expectation of growth rate per attempt. In order to
determine the price of the game, we require a riskless interest rate, r > 0, for a
particular period. The equation Gu(tu) = r+ 1 (if r is simple) or Gu(tu) = e
r (if r
is continuously compounded) is used to determine the price of a game. If a(x) ≥ 0
for each x ∈ I, then the existence and uniqueness of the price are guaranteed by
the fact that Gu(tu) is continuous and strictly decreases from +∞ to 1 with respect
to 0 < u < E :=
∫
I a(x)d(F (x)) (Theorem 4.1). In this context, the price of the
St. Petersburg game (Daniel Bernoulli (1738; English trans. 1954)) is determined
to be 5.1052 if the riskless interest rate is 4% (Example 6.4). On the other hand,
the Black-Scholes formula is deduced from the equation E/u = er, where E is the
expectation of a European option (Example 6.6).
2. Optimal proportion of investment
Assume that the profit function a(x) is measurable with the distribution function
F (x) defined on an interval I ⊆ (−∞, +∞). Set ξ := infx∈I a(x). We also assume
that ξ > −∞ and ξ is the essential infimum of a(x), that is, ∫a(x)<ξ+ε d(F (x)) > 0
for each ε > 0. Further, assume that a(x) is not a constant function (a.e.), that is,∫
a(x)<ξ+δ d(F (x)) < 1 for some δ > 0.
We use the following notation.
E :=
∫
I
a(x)d(F (x)), H :=
∫
I
1
a(x)
d(F (x)), Hξ :=
∫
I
1
a(x)− ξ d(F (x)).
(1)
In this paper, we assume that E > 0. If
∫
a(x)=ξ d(F (x)) > 0, we define Hξ = +∞
and 1/Hξ = 0.
Since a(x) is not constant, we have ξ < E, Hξ > 0, and 1/Hξ < +∞. From
the relation
1 =
(∫
I
√
a(x) − ξ × 1√
a(x)− ξ d(F (x))
)2
<
∫
I
(a(x)− ξ)d(F (x)) ×
∫
I
1
a(x)− ξ d(F (x)) = (E − ξ)Hξ,
we have ξ + 1/Hξ < E. In particular, if ξ = 0, 0 ≤ 1/H < E. If ξ > 0, then using
1/ξ ≥ 1/a(x) and 1 =
√
a(x)× (1/
√
a(x)), we have ξ < 1/H < E.
For price u > 0, let tu ∈ [0, 1] be the optimal proportion of investment. The
precise definition of the term ”optimal” and its significance is provided in Section
5. Here, we present certain properties of tu in order to explain the approximate
outline of the paper.
(a) If u > E, tu = 0.
3Assume that u > E and t ∈ (0, 1], then the expectation of profits,Mt ∫
I
a(x)/u
d(F (x)) +M(1 − t) = M −M(1 − E/u)t, is less than M . More precisely, using
Jensen’s inequality, we have Gu(t) < 1 − (1 − E/u)t < 1 = Gu(0) for each t ∈ (0,
1]. Therefore, tu = 0.
In the proof of Theorem 5.1, we will show that:
{u | tu = 0} =
{
[E,+∞), if E < +∞,
φ, if E = +∞. (2)
(b) If ξ > 0 and 0 < u ≤ ξ, then tu = 1.
From 0 < u ≤ ξ ≤ a(x) and t ∈ [0, 1), we have Mta(x)/u + M(1 − t) =
Ma(x)/u −M(1 − t)(a(x)/u − 1) ≤ Ma(x)/u for each x ∈ I. This implies that
Gu(t) < Gu(1) for each t ∈ [0, 1), that is, tu = 1.
Accordingly, in the proof of Theorem 5.1, we will also show that
{u | tu = 1} =
{
(0, 1/H ], if ξ > 0, or ξ = 0 and H < +∞,
φ, if ξ < 0, or ξ = 0 and H = +∞, (3)
which yields a maximum price of 1/H at which all the capital should be repeatedly
invested.
(c) If max(0, ξ) < u, tu ≤ u/(u− ξ).
If t > u/(u − ξ), u − ξ − u/t > 0. Therefore, the negative result Mta(x)/u
+M(1− t) < 0 occurs with a positive probability ∫
ξ≤a(x)<ξ+(u−ξ−u/t)
d(F (x)) > 0.
This contradicts the concept of continual investment without borrowing.
In the proof of Theorem 5.1, the existence of tu is shown such that:
{u | tu = u
u− ξ } =
{
(0, ξ + 1/Hξ], if ξ ≤ 0 and ξ + 1/Hξ > 0,
φ, if ξ > 0 or ξ + 1/Hξ ≤ 0. (4)
( d ) Theorem 5.1 also shows that tu /∈ {0, 1, u/(u−ξ)} if and only if 1/H < u < E
(if ξ ≥ 0) or max(0, ξ + 1/Hξ) < u < E (if ξ < 0). In this case, tu can be uniquely
determined by the property:∫
I
a(x)− u
a(x)tu − utu + ud(F (x)) = 0. (5)
3. Pre-optimal proportion
We denote the integral
∫
I
(a(x)−β)/(a(x)z−zβ+β)d(F (x)) by wβ(z), in which
z and β are complex variables.
Lemma 3.1. The function wβ(z) is holomorphic with respect to two complex
variables z := t+ si and β := u+ hi such that,
(a) max(ε, ξ) < u < L,
(b) |h| < ε6/(32(L+ 1)R2),
(c) |z| < R and z /∈ {|s| ≤ ε} ∩ {t ≤ ε or t ≥ u/(u− ξ)− ε},
where 0 < ε < min(1/2, u/(2(u − ξ))), max(ε, ξ) < L < +∞, max(2, u/(u
−ξ)) < R < +∞, i := √−1, Im(z) = s and Im(β) = h.
4Proof. We obtain certain operator exchange properties such as
∂
∂t
wβ(z) =
∫
I
∂
∂t
(
a(x)− β
a(x)z − zβ + β
)
d(F (x))
by proving that the related integrands are bounded. Because (a(x)− β) /(a(x)z
−zβ+β) satisfies the Cauchy-Riemann equations, wβ(z) is shown to be holomorphic
due to Hartogs’s theorem.
It should be noted that the condition (a) above leads to β 6= 0, and if a(x) 6= β,
then we have
a(x)− β
a(x)z − zβ + β =
1
z − 1
1− a(x)β
.
In the following four cases, we assume that a(x) 6= β.
In this proof, we will frequently use the inequality |1/(1− z)| ≤ |2/z| if |z| ≥ 2.
<Case 1> |a(x)| ≥ 8(L+ 1)/ε.
As a result of the conditions, we have |a(x)/u| > |a(x)/L| > |a(x)/(L + 1)|
≥ 8/ε > 16, which leads to |1/(1− a(x)/u)| ≤ |2/(a(x)/u))| < |2(L+ 1)/a(x)|
≤ ε/4. On the other hand, the inequality |a(x)/β| >
∣∣∣ a(x)L+1 ∣∣∣ ≥ 8/ε > 16 leads
to |1/(1− a(x)/β)| ≤ |2/(a(x)/β)| < |2(L+ 1)/a(x)| ≤ ε/4, where |β| ≤ u + |h|
< L+ 1.
Moreover, from ξ ≤ a(x) we have 1−a(x)/u ≤ (u−ξ)/u. If 1−a(x)/u > 0 then
u/(u− ξ) ≤ 1/(1− a(x)/u), which leads to |z − 1/(1− a(x)/u))| > ε due to (c). If
1 − a(x)/u < 0 then 1/(1 − a(x)/u) < 0, which leads to |z − 1/(1− a(x)/u))| > ε
due to (c). If 1 − a(x)/u = 0 then L > u = |a(x)| ≥ 8(L + 1)/ε, which is a
contradiction. Therefore, we have∣∣∣∣∣z − 11− a(x)β
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣z − 11− a(x)u +
1
1− a(x)u
− 1
1− a(x)β
∣∣∣∣∣ > ε2 ,
which establishes
1∣∣∣∣z − 11− a(x)β
∣∣∣∣ <
2
ε
.
Moreover, using |a(x)/(1− a(x)/β)| ≤ |2β|, |1/(1− a(x)/β)| < ε/4, and 1/ |β|
< 1/ε, we have∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
a(x)
β2
(
z − 1
1−
a(x)
β
)2 (
1− a(x)β
)2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
<
2
ε2
.
<Case 2> |a(x)| < 8(L+ 1)/ε and |a(x)/β − 1| ≤ ε/R.
Since |(a(x)/β − 1) z| ≤ ε, we have |a(x)z/β − z + 1| ≥ 1− ε. Therefore,∣∣∣∣∣
a(x)
β − 1
a(x)
β z − z + 1
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ εR1− ε < 2εR .
5Moreover, using 1/ |β| < 1/ε and 1/(1− ε) < 2, we have∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
a(x)
β2
(
z − 1
1− a(x)β
)2 (
1− a(x)β
)2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
a(x)
β2
(
a(x)
β z − z + 1
)2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ <
32(L+ 1)
ε3
.
<Case 3> |a(x)| < 8(L+1)/ε, |a(x)/β − 1| > ε/R, and |a(x)/u− 1| > ε/(2R).
From 1/ |β| < 1/ε, 1/u < 1/ε, and condition (b) mentioned above, we have∣∣∣∣∣ 11− a(x)u −
1
1− a(x)β
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣ a(x)hiuβ(1− a(x)u )(1− a(x)β )
∣∣∣∣∣ < ε2 .
Therefore, as in Case 1, we obtain
1∣∣∣∣z − 11− a(x)β
∣∣∣∣ <
2
ε
.
Moreover, this implies that∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
a(x)
β2
(
z − 1
1− a(x)β
)2 (
1− a(x)β
)2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
<
32(L+ 1)R2
ε7
.
<Case 4> |a(x)| < 8(L+1)/ε, |a(x)/β − 1| > ε/R, and |a(x)/u− 1| ≤ ε/(2R).
This case is void as shown below:
ε
2R
<
∣∣∣∣a(x)β − 1
∣∣∣∣− ∣∣∣∣a(x)u − 1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣a(x)β − a(x)u
∣∣∣∣ = |ha(x)||βu| < ε34R2 ,
which leads to the contradiction 4 < 2R < ε2 < 1/4.
<Conclusion> From the inequalities mentioned above, the four integrands
on the right-hand side of the following equalities are bounded. Therefore, the
Cauchy-Riemann equations for wβ(z) hold.
∂
∂t
wβ(z) =
∫
a(x) 6=β
−1(
z − 1
1− a(x)β
)2 d(F (x)), (6)
∂
∂s
wβ(z) =
∫
a(x) 6=β
−i(
z − 1
1−
a(x)
β
)2 d(F (x)),
∂
∂u
wβ(z) =
∫
a(x) 6=β
−a(x)
β2
(
a(x)
β z − z + 1
)2 d(F (x)),
∂
∂h
wβ(z) =
∫
a(x) 6=β
−a(x)i
β2
(
a(x)
β z − z + 1
)2 d(F (x)).

6Henceforth, in this Section, we assume that max(0, ξ) < u < E and 0 < t
< u/(u− ξ). It should be noted that a(x)t− ut+ u ≥ ξt− ut+ u = (u− ξ)(u/(u−
ξ)− t) > 0 for each x ∈ I.
Lemma 3.2. wu(t) is strictly decreasing with respect to t.
Proof. According to Lemma 3.1, we have
∂
∂t
wu(t) = −
∫
I
(
a(x)− u
a(x)t − ut+ u
)2
d(F (x)) < 0.

Lemma 3.3. limt→0+ wu(t) = E/u− 1.
Proof. Since (a(x) − u)/(a(x)t − ut + u) is strictly decreasing (a(x) 6= u) with
respect to 0 < t < u/(u− ξ), using Lebesgue (monotone convergence) theorem, we
obtain
lim
t→0+
wu(t) = lim
t→0+
∫
I
a(x)− u
a(x)t − ut+ ud(F (x)) =
∫
I
a(x)− u
u
d(F (x)) =
E
u
−1.

Lemma 3.4. limt→(u/(u−ξ))− wu(t) = (1− ξ/u)Hξ(ξ + 1/Hξ − u).
Proof. Using the same principle as above, we obtain
lim
t→(u/(u−ξ))−
wu(t) =
u− ξ
u
∫
I
a(x)− u
a(x)− ξ d(F (x))
=
u− ξ
u
(1− (u− ξ)Hξ) = (1− ξ/u)Hξ(ξ + 1/Hξ − u).

From the above lemmas, if max(0, ξ+ 1/Hξ) < u < E, then limt→0+ wu(t) > 0
and limt→(u/(u−ξ))− wu(t) < 0. Thus, the equation wu(t) = 0 has the only solution
t˜u ∈ (0, u/(u− ξ)), and we refer to it as pre-optimal proportion. Note that, due to
Lemma 3.1 and the inverse mapping theorem, t˜u is continuous with respect to u.
Lemma 3.5. If ξ > 0, ξ + 1/Hξ < 1/H.
Proof. Since wu(t) is strictly decreasing and 1 < u/(u−ξ), wu(1) > limt→(u/(u−ξ))−
wu(t), that is,∫
I
a(x)− u
a(x) − u+ ud(F (x)) = H(1/H − u) > (1− ξ/u)Hξ(ξ + 1/Hξ − u)
for each ξ < u < E. If 1/H ≤ ξ + 1/Hξ, then selecting u = ξ + 1/Hξ < E leads to
the contradiction that 0 ≥ H(1/H − u) > (1− ξ/u)Hξ(ξ + 1/Hξ − u) = 0. 
Lemma 3.6. If ξ ≥ 0, then t˜u is strictly decreasing with respect to u ∈ (ξ+1/Hξ,
E).
7Proof. From Lemma 3.1, t˜u is analytic. Using
∂
∂u
(
a(x)− u
a(x)t˜u − ut˜u + u
)
= −a(x) + (a(x)− u)
2 detu
du
(a(x)t˜u − ut˜u + u)2
,
dwu(t˜u)/du = 0, and a(x) ≥ ξ ≥ 0, we obtain
dt˜u
du
=
− ∫I a(x)(a(x)etu−uetu+u)2 d(F (x))∫
I
(a(x)−u)2
(a(x)etu−uetu+u)2
d(F (x))
< 0.

Lemma 3.7. limu→E− t˜u = 0.
Proof. <Case 1>. Assume that E = +∞. From limu→+∞ u/(u− ξ) = 1, for any
0 < ε < 1/3, there exists N such that 1 − ε < u/(u − ξ) < 1 + ε for each u > N.
This implies that∣∣∣∣ a(x) − ua(x)t− ut+ u
∣∣∣∣ = 1∣∣∣∣t− 11− a(x)u
∣∣∣∣ <
1
ε
(ε ≤ t ≤ 1−2ε, u > N, a(x) 6= u).
Therefore, by Lebesgue (dominated-convergence) theorem, we obtain
lim
u→+∞
wu(t) =
∫
I
1
t− 1d(F (x)) =
−1
1− t < 0.
In particular, limu→+∞ wu(ε) = −1/(1 − ε) < 0. Therefore, there exists M > 0
such that wu(ε) < −1/(2(1 − ε)) for each u > M . On the basis of the fact that
wu(t) is strictly decreasing with respect to t, we have 0 < t˜u < ε for each u > M.
This implies that limu→+∞ t˜u = 0.
<Case 2> Assume that E < +∞. By Lemma 3.1, the analytic function wE(t)
is well defined with respect to t ∈ (0, E/(E − ξ)). Similarly, from Lemmas 3.2 and
3.3, we know that wE(t) is strictly decreasing and limt→0+ wE(t) = 0. Therefore,
we have wE(t) < 0.
If 0 < ε < E/(2(E −ξ)) and (E +max(0, ξ))/2 < u < E, then due to 0 < ε
< u/(u − ξ), wu(ε) is well defined. By Lemma 3.1 we have limu→E− wu(ε) =
wE(ε) < 0. Therefore, there exists δ > 0 such that wu(ε) < 0 for each u ∈ (E−δ, E).
This implies that 0 < t˜u < ε and limu→E− t˜u = 0. 
Lemma 3.8. If ξ > 0, t˜1/H = 1.
Proof. If ξ > 0, then by Lemma 3.5 we have ξ+1/Hξ < 1/H < E and 1 < u/(u−ξ).
Therefore, wu(t) and t˜u are analytic near (u, t) = (1/H , 1). The conclusion follows
from the equality
w1/H(1) =
∫
I
a(x)− 1H
a(x) − 1H + 1H
d(F (x)) = 0.

Lemma 3.9. If ξ > 0, limu→(ξ+1/Hξ)+ t˜u = 1 + ξHξ.
Proof. Due to Lemma 3.6, limu→(ξ+1/Hξ)+ t˜u exists, and we denote it by γ. It is
clear that γ > 1. According to the inequality t˜u < u/(u− ξ), we have γ ≤ 1+ ξHξ.
8Assume Hξ < +∞ and γ < 1 + ξHξ, then, for any 0 < ε < min((1 + ξHξ
−γ)/3, γ/2), there exists δ > 0 such that∣∣t˜u − γ∣∣ < ε and ∣∣∣∣ uu− ξ − (1 + ξHξ)
∣∣∣∣ < ε
for each u ∈ (ξ + 1/Hξ, ξ + 1/Hξ + δ). This implies that∣∣∣∣∣t˜u − 11− a(x)u
∣∣∣∣∣ > ε,
where a(x) 6= u. By Lebesgue theorem, we obtain
0 = lim
u→(ξ+1/Hξ)+
∫
I
1
t˜u − 1
1− a(x)u
d(F (x)) =
∫
I
1
γ − 1
1− a(x)
ξ+1/Hξ
d(F (x)).
This is a contradiction because the term on the right is positive, which is deduced
from the fact that the function∫
I
1
t− 1
1− a(x)
ξ+1/Hξ
d(F (x))
is strictly decreasing form E/(ξ+1/Hξ)−1 > 0 to 0 with respect to t ∈ (0, 1+ξHξ).
Assume Hξ = +∞ and γ < +∞. Then, we have 0 < 1/(a(x)γ − ξγ + ξ)
≤ 1/(a(x)t˜u− ξt˜u+ ξ) ≤ 1/ξ for each ξ < u < E. Therefore, by Lebesgue theorem,
we obtain
0 = lim
u→ξ+
∫
I
a(x)− u
a(x)t˜u − ut˜u + u
d(F (x))
= lim
u→ξ+
1
t˜u
(1− u
∫
I
1
a(x)t˜u − ut˜u + u
d(F (x)))
=
1
γ
(1− ξ
∫
I
1
a(x)γ − ξγ + ξ d(F (x))) >
1
γ
(1− ξ
∫
I
1
ξ
d(F (x))) = 0,
which is a contradiction. This implies that if Hξ = +∞, γ = 1 + ξHξ = +∞.

Lemma 3.10. If ξ < 0 and ξ + 1/Hξ > 0, limu→(ξ+1/Hξ)+ t˜u = 1 + ξHξ.
Proof. Due to 1/Hξ > −ξ > 0, we have Hξ < +∞. It should be noted that
there exists δ > 0 such that t˜u is strictly increasing or decreasing in the interval
u ∈ (ξ + 1/Hξ, ξ + 1/Hξ + δ), which is demonstrated in the proof of Lemma
3.16. Therefore, limu→(ξ+1/Hξ)+ t˜u exists and denoted by γ. By the inequality
t˜u < u/(u− ξ), we have γ ≤ 1 + ξHξ. Assume γ < 1 + ξHξ, then, as in the proof
of Lemma 3.9, we have a contradiction. 
Lemma 3.11. If ξ = 0 and 1/H > 0, limu→(1/H)+ t˜u = 1.
Proof. It should be noted that H < +∞. Due to Lemma 3.6, limu→(1/H)+ t˜u
exists, and is denoted by γ. According to the relation t˜u < u/(u− ξ) = 1, we have
γ ≤ 1. Assume γ < 1, then as in the proof of Lemma 3.9, the function mentioned
there is strictly decreasing from HE − 1 > 0 to 0 in the interval t ∈ (0, 1), which
leads to a contradiction. 
9Lemma 3.12. If ξ < 0 and ξ + 1/Hξ ≤ 0, limu→0+ t˜u = 0.
Proof. On the basis of the definition, 0 < t˜u < u/(u − ξ) and max(0, ξ) = 0 < u
< E. Therefore, 0 ≤ limu→0+ t˜u ≤ limu→0+ u/(u− ξ) = 0. 
Lemma 3.13. If ξ ≤ 0, t˜u <
∫
a(x) 6=0 d(F (x)).
Proof. As ξ ≤ 0, we have 0 < t˜u < u/(u − ξ) ≤ 1 for each u ∈ (ξ + 1/Hξ, E). In
this case, the equation wu(t˜u) = 0 is equivalent to
−1
−t˜u + 1
∫
a(x)=0
d(F (x)) +
1
t˜u
∫
a(x) 6=0
d(F (x))
=
u
t˜u
∫
a(x) 6=0
1
a(x)t˜u − ut˜u + u
d(F (x)) > 0,
which leads to t˜u <
∫
a(x) 6=0 d(F (x)). 
Lemma 3.14. If ξ = 0 and H = +∞, limu→0+ t˜u =
∫
a(x)>0 d(F (x)).
Proof. Due to Lemma 3.6, limu→0+ t˜u exists, and we denote it by γ. We can
choose δ > 0 such that γ/2 < t˜u < γ for each u ∈ (0, δ). It should be noted that
the equation wu(t˜u) = 0 is equivalent to
−1
−t˜u + 1
∫
a(x)=0
d(F (x)) +
∫
a(x)>0
1
t˜u − 1
1− a(x)u
d(F (x)) = 0.
Assume that γ < 1, we have∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1t˜u − 1
1− a(x)u
∣∣∣∣∣∣ <
{ 1
1−γ , if 0 < a(x) < u,
2
γ , if a(x) > u,
for each u ∈ (0, δ). In this case, by Lebesgue theorem, we obtain
−1
−γ + 1
∫
a(x)=0
d(F (x)) +
1
γ
∫
a(x)>0
d(F (x)) = 0,
which implies that γ =
∫
a(x)>0 d(F (x)).
In the case in which γ = 1, due to Lemma 3.13, we have γ ≤ ∫a(x)>0 d(F (x))
≤ 1. Thus, γ = ∫
a(x)>0
d(F (x)). 
Lemma 3.15. The function t˜u/u is strictly decreasing with respect to u ∈ (max(0,
ξ + 1/Hξ), E).
Proof. Using the equality∫
I
a(x)− u
a(x)t˜u − ut˜u + u
d(F (x)) =
∫
I
(a(x) − u)2t˜u + a(x)u − u2(
a(x)t˜u − ut˜u + u
)2 d(F (x)) = 0
10
and by the proof of Lemma 3.6, we obtain
d
du
(
t˜u
u
)
= −
u
∫
I
a(x)
(a(x)etu−uetu+u)2
d(F (x)) + t˜u
∫
I
(a(x)−u)2
(a(x)etu−uetu+u)2
d(F (x))
u2
∫
I
(a(x)−u)2
(a(x)etu−uetu+u)2
d(F (x))
= −
∫
I
1
(a(x)etu−uetu+u)2
d(F (x))∫
I
(a(x)−u)2
(a(x)etu−uetu+u)2
d(F (x))
< 0.

We define the continuous function tu in the interval [0, +∞) as follows:
If ξ > 0, then tu :=

1, if 0 ≤ u ≤ 1/H,
t˜u, if 1/H < u < E,
0, if u ≥ E.
(7)
If ξ = 0, then tu :=

∫
a(x)>0 d(F (x)), if u = 0.
1, if 0 < u ≤ 1/H,
t˜u, if 1/H < u < E,
0, if u ≥ E.
(8)
If ξ < 0, then tu :=

u
u−ξ , if 0 ≤ u ≤ max(0, ξ + 1/Hξ),
t˜u, if max(0, ξ + 1/Hξ) < u < E,
0, if u ≥ E.
(9)
Lemma 3.16. If ξ < 0, then the value 0 < umax < E exists, which satisfies the
following properties:
(a) tu is strictly increasing in the interval 0 < u < umax.
(b) tu is strictly decreasing in the interval umax < u < E.
Proof. tu/u = 1/(u − ξ) is strictly decreasing in the interval 0 < u < ξ + 1/Hξ,
if ξ + 1/Hξ > 0. Using Lemma 3.15, we have that tu/u is strictly decreasing in
the interval 0 < u < E. We denote the value of limu→0+ tu/u by η > 0. As the
function y := tu/u is strictly decreasing with respect to u, tu can be considered to
be a function with a variable y ∈ (0, η).
If u ∈ (max(0, ξ + 1/Hξ), E), tu = t˜u. From wu(t˜u) = 0 we have∫
I
1
a(x)y − tu + 1
d(F (x)) = 1.
Thus, ∫
I
a(x) − dtudy(
a(x)y − tu + 1
)2 d(F (x)) = 0.
This implies that
dtu
dy
=
∫
I
a(x)
(a(x)y−tu+1)2
d(F (x))∫
I
1
(a(x)y−tu+1)2
d(F (x))
.
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Denoting
∫
I
1
(a(x)y−tu+1)2
d(F (x)) by s, we obtain
d2tu
dy2
=
1
s2
 −2s ∫I a(x)(a(x)−dtudy )(a(x)y−tu+1)3 d(F (x))
+2
∫
I
a(x)
(a(x)y−tu+1)2
d(F (x)) × ∫I a(x)− dtudy(a(x)y−tu+1)3 d(F (x))

=
−2
s3

s2
∫
I
a(x)2
(a(x)y−tu+1)3
d(F (x))
−2s ∫
I
a(x)
(a(x)y−tu+1)2
d(F (x))
∫
I
a(x)
(a(x)y−tu+1)3
d(F (x))
+
(∫
I
a(x)
(a(x)y−tu+1)2
d(F (x))
)2
× ∫
I
1
(a(x)y−tu+1)3
d(F (x))
 .
As a quadratic function with respect to s, −s3/2 × d2tu/dy2 has the determinant
given by (∫
I
a(x)
(a(x)y − tu + 1)2 d(F (x))
)2
× (∫I a(x)(a(x)y−tu+1)3 d(F (x)))2
− ∫I a(x)2(a(x)y−tu+1)3 d(F (x)) × ∫I 1(a(x)y−tu+1)3 d(F (x))

Due to Ho¨lder inequality with respect to the two functions a(x)
(a(x)y−tu+1)3/2
and
1
(a(x)y−tu+1)3/2
, this determinant is negative. Therefore, we have d
2tu
dy2 < 0, which
implies that dtudy is strictly decreasing.
First, we assume that ξ + 1/Hξ ≤ 0. Assign α := limy→0+ dtu/dy and β
:= limy→η− dtu/dy.
If α ≤ 0, then dtu/dy < 0 for each 0 < y < η. This contradicts the fact that
tu = 0 if y = 0 (Lemma 3.7), and tu > 0 if 0 < y < η. Therefore, α > 0.
If β ≥ 0, dtu/dy > 0 for each 0 < y < η. This contradicts the fact that tu = 0
if y = η (Lemma 3.11), and tu > 0 if 0 < y < η. Therefore, β < 0.
The value 0 < ymax < η such that dtu/dy|y=ymax = 0 can then be determined.
The value 0 < umax < E required is determined using ymax.
Second, we assume that ξ + 1/Hξ > 0. If u ∈ (0, ξ + 1/Hξ), then tu =
u/(u − ξ) is strictly increasing. Moreover, we have u/(u − ξ)|u=ξ+1/Hξ = 1 +
ξHξ = limu→(ξ+1/Hξ)+ t˜u (Lemma 3.10) and y|u=ξ+1/Hξ = Hξ. Redefine β as
limy→H−
ξ
dtu/dy. If β < 0, then as above, we obtain the required valueHξ<umax<E.
If β ≥ 0, dtu/dy > 0 for each 0 < y < Hξ. This implies that dtu/du = dtu/dy ×
dy/du < 0 since dy/du < 0 for each u ∈ (ξ + 1/Hξ, E) (Lemma 3.15). Thus, tu is
strictly decreasing. Therefore, the required value is umax = ξ + 1/Hξ. 
4. Pre-growth rate
In this Section we assume that u ∈ (max(0, ξ), E) and ρ, t ∈ (0, u/(u − ξ))
unless otherwise mentioned. Define Gu,ρ(t) by the equality
exp
(∫ t
ρ
wu(t)dt
)
= exp
(∫
I
log
a(x)t − ut+ u
a(x)ρ − uρ+ ud(F (x))
)
, (10)
which can be verified using the following inequalities.
min
(
t
ρ
,
u/(u− ξ)− t
u/(u− ξ)− ρ
)
<
∣∣∣∣ a(x)t − ut+ ua(x)ρ − uρ+ u
∣∣∣∣ < max( tρ , u/(u− ξ)− tu/(u− ξ)− ρ
)
,
12 ∣∣∣∣ a(x) − ua(x)s− us+ u
∣∣∣∣ < 1min(ρ, t, u/(u− ξ)− ρ, u/(u− ξ)− t)
for each x ∈ I and s ∈ (min(ρ, t), max(ρ, t)). As wu(t) is strictly decreasing with
respect to t from the positive value E/u−1, to the value (1−ξ/u)Hξ(ξ+1/Hξ−u)
(Lemmas 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4),
∫ t
ρ wu(t)dt is strictly decreasing with respect to ρ near
0+. Therefore, the limit
lim
ρ→0+
exp
(∫ t
ρ
wu(t)dt
)
= exp
(
lim
ρ→0+
∫
I
log
a(x)t− ut+ u
a(x)ρ− uρ+ ud(F (x))
)
(11)
= exp
(∫
I
log (a(x)t/u− t+ 1)d(F (x))
)
finitely exists or +∞, which we denote by G˜u(t) and refer to as pre-growth rate.
The equality mentioned above is obtained using Lebesgue theorem because the
integrand is monotone with respect to ρ in { x | a(x) > u } or { x | a(x)<u }.
Lemma 4.1. G˜u(t) < E/u.
Proof. By Jensen’s inequality we have∫
I
log (a(x)t/u− t+ 1) d(F (x)) ≤ log
∫
I
(a(x)t/u− t+ 1)d(F (x))
= log(Et/u− t+ 1) < log(E/u).

Lemma 4.2.
∫
a(x)<u |log (a(x)t/u− t+ 1)| d(F (x)) < +∞.
Proof. In general, a(x)t/u − t + 1 ≥ (u − ξ)(u/(u − ξ) − t)/u > 0. If a(x) < u,
a(x)t/u− t+ 1<1. Therefore, we obtain∫
a(x)<u
|log (a(x)t/u − t+ 1)| d(F (x)) ≤
∣∣∣∣log(u− ξu
(
u
u− ξ − t
))∣∣∣∣ < +∞.

Lemma 4.3. The following three statements are equivalent.
(1)
∫
a(x)>1
log a(x)d(F (x)) < +∞.
(2) G˜u(t) < +∞ for each u and t.
(3) G˜u1(t1) < +∞ for some u1 and t1.
Proof. (1) =⇒ (2). The function log (a(x)t/u− t+ 1) satisfies the following
inequalities.∫
u<a(x)≤1 or 1≤a(x)<u
|log a(x)| d(F (x)) ≤ |log u| < +∞.
13∣∣∣∣∣
∫
a(x)>u
log (a(x)t/u− t+ 1)d(F (x)) −
∫
a(x)>u
log a(x)d(F (x))
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
a(x)>u
(
log
t
u
+ log
(
1 +
u(1− t)
a(x)t
))
d(F (x))
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣log tu
∣∣∣∣+ |log t| < +∞.
Based on Lemma 4.2, we obtain the integrability of log (a(x)t/u− t+ 1) .
(3) =⇒ (1). It should be noted that u1 ∈ (max(0, ξ), E) and t1 ∈ (0, u1/(u1−
ξ)). The result can be obtained in a similar manner as above.
(2) =⇒ (3). It is clear. 
If one of the above three statements is satisfied, we can write G˜ < +∞.
Lemma 4.4. If G˜ < +∞, limt→0+ G˜u(t) = 1.
Proof. Since limt→0+ wu(t) = E/u − 1 > 0 (Lemma 3.3),
∫ t
0 wu(t)dt is strictly
increasing and bounded with respect to t near 0+. Therefore, we obtain that
limt→0+
∫ t
0
wu(t)dt = 0. 
Lemma 4.5. If u ∈ (max(0, ξ + 1/Hξ), E), max0<t<u/(u−ξ)Gu,ρ(t) = Gu,ρ(t˜u).
Proof. It is clear form the facts that 0 < Gu,ρ(t) < +∞ and
∂Gu,ρ(t)/∂t =
∂
∂t
exp
(∫ t
ρ
wu(t)dt
)
= Gu,ρ(t)
(
∂
∂t
∫ t
ρ
wu(t)dt
)
= Gu,ρ(t)wu(t).

Lemma 4.6. If G˜ < +∞ and u ∈ (max(0, ξ + 1/Hξ), E), max0<t<u/(u−ξ)
G˜u(t) = G˜u(t˜u).
Proof. In a similar manner as that of the proof of Lemma 4.5, we have
∂G˜u(t)
∂t
=
∂
∂t
lim
ρ→0+
exp
(∫ t
ρ
wu(t)dt
)
= lim
ρ→0+
∂
∂t
exp
(∫ t
ρ
wu(t)dt
)
= lim
ρ→0+
Gu,ρ(t)wu(t) = G˜u(t)wu(t),
which implies the conclusion. 
Lemma 4.7. Two functions Gu,ρ(t) and G˜u(t) (< +∞) are concave with respect
to t.
Proof. Using Lemmas 3.2, 4.5, and Ho¨lder inequality, we have
∂2Gu,ρ(t)/∂t
2 = Gu,ρ(t)(w
2
u(t) + ∂wu(t)/∂t)
= Gu,ρ(t)
( (∫
I
(a(x)− u)/(a(x)t− ut+ u)d(F (x)))2
− ∫I(a(x) − u)2/(a(x)t− ut+ u)2d(F (x))
)
< 0.
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
Using the above result, we also have ∂2G˜u(t)/∂t
2 < 0.
Lemma 4.8. If ξ ≥ 0 and t > ρ, Gu,ρ(t) is strictly decreasing with respect to u.
Proof. From a(x) ≥ 0, we obtain
∂Gu,ρ(t)
∂u
=
∂
∂u
exp
(∫ t
ρ
wu(t)dt
)
= Gu,ρ(t)× ∂
∂u
∫ t
ρ
wu(t)dt
= −Gu,ρ(t)×
∫ t
ρ
(∫
I
a(x)
(a(x)t− ut+ u)2 d(F (x))
)
dt < 0.

Lemma 4.9. If ξ ≥ 0 and G˜ < +∞, G˜u(t) is strictly decreasing with respect to u.
Proof. Using Lemma 4.8, we obtain the conclusion. 
Lemma 4.10. If G˜ < +∞, limt→(u/(u−ξ))− G˜u(t) = exp(
∫
I
log (a(x)− ξ) d(F (x)))
/(u− ξ) for each u.
Proof. If a(x) > u, a(x)t/u−t+1 is strictly increasing with respect to t. Therefore,
using Lebesgue theorem, we have
0 ≤ lim
t→(u/(u−ξ))−
∫
a(x)>u
log(a(x)t/u − t+ 1)d(F (x))
=
∫
a(x)>u
log
a(x) − ξ
u− ξ d(F (x)) < +∞.
On the other hand, if a(x) < u, then a(x)t/u − t + 1 is strictly decreasing with
respect to t. Hence, using Lebesgue theorem, we have
lim
t→(u/(u−ξ))−
∫
a(x)<u
log(a(x)t/u− t+ 1)d(F (x))
=
∫
a(x)<u
log
a(x)− ξ
u− ξ d(F (x)) < 0,
which implies that
lim
t→(u/(u−ξ))−
G˜u(t)
= exp
(∫
a(x)>u
log
a(x)− ξ
u− ξ d(F (x)) +
∫
a(x)<u
log
a(x)− ξ
u− ξ d(F (x))
)
= exp
(∫
I
log (a(x)− ξ) d(F (x))
)
/(u− ξ).

As an expansion of the definition of G˜u(t), we define G˜u((u/(u − ξ))−) by
exp(
∫
I
log (a(x) − ξ) d(F (x))) /(u− ξ) for each u ∈ (max(0, ξ), E).
Lemma 4.11. G˜u(t˜u) > 1 if u ∈ (max(0, ξ + 1/Hξ), E).
15
Proof. If 0 < t < t˜u, wu(t) > 0. Hence, we have
G˜u(t˜u) = exp(
∫ etu
0
wu(t)dt) > e
0 = 1.

Lemma 4.12. G˜u(t˜u) (< +∞) is strictly decreasing with respect to u ∈ (max(0,
ξ + 1/Hξ), E).
Proof. If |a(x)| ≤ 2 |ξ|, we have∣∣∣∣ a(x)a(x)t− ut+ u
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣ a(x)(a(x)− ξ)t+ ξt− ut+ u
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2 |ξ|(u− ξ)(u/(u− ξ)− t) .
On the other hand, if a(x) > 2 |ξ|, we have∣∣∣∣ a(x)a(x)t− ut+ u
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣ a(x)(a(x)− ξ)t+ ξt− ut+ u
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣ a(x)(a(x) − ξ)t
∣∣∣∣ < 2t .
Thus, by the definition of G˜u(t), we have
∂G˜u(t)
∂u
= G˜u(t)
∫
I
∂
∂u
log(a(x)t/u − t+ 1)d(F (x))
= − t
u
G˜u(t)×
(∫
I
a(x)
a(x)t− ut+ ud(F (x))
)
.
The definition wu(t˜u) = 0 leads to
∫
I a(x)/(a(x)t˜u−ut˜u+u)d(F (x)) = 1. Therefore,
∂G˜u(t˜u)
∂u
= − t˜u
u
G˜u(t˜u) < 0.

Lemma 4.13. If G˜ < +∞, limu→E− G˜u(t˜u) = 1.
Proof. From Lemmas 4.11 and 4.12, limu→E− G˜u(t˜u) ≥ 1 exists. Assume that
ξ ≥ 0, then from Lemmas 3.6 and 3.7, t˜u/(1− t˜u) is strictly decreasing near u = E−.
Applying Lebesgue theorem to the equality
G˜u(t˜u)− 1 + t˜u = (1− t˜u)
(
exp
(∫
I
log
(
a(x)t˜u
u(1− t˜u)
+ 1
)
d(F (x))
)
− 1
)
we have
lim
u→E−
(
G˜u(t˜u)− 1 + t˜u
)
= exp
(∫
I
log (0 + 1) d(F (x))
)
− 1 = 0.
This implies that limu→E− G˜u(t˜u) = 1.
In the case in which ξ < 0, Lemma 3.16 can be used as a substitution of Lemma
3.6 near u = E−, where t˜u is strictly decreasing to 0. In order to apply Lebesgue
theorem, it is sufficient to divide the above integration into two parts { x | a(x) ≥ 0
} and { x | a(x) < 0 }. 
Lemma 4.14. If G˜ < +∞ and u ∈ (max(0, ξ+1/Hξ), G˜u(t˜u) = exp
(∫ E
u t˜u/udu
)
.
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Proof. Using ∂G˜u(t˜u)/∂u = −t˜u/u×G˜u(t˜u) (Lemmas 4.12 and 4.13), we can solve
the differential equation. 
Lemma 4.15 If ξ = 0 and H = +∞, limu→0+ G˜u(t˜u) = +∞.
Proof. Lemma 4.12 ensures the existence of limu→0+ G˜u(t˜u), which is finite or
+∞. If a(x) > 0, a(x)/u is strictly decreasing with respect to u. Using Lebesgue
theorem, we have
lim
u→0+
G˜u(t˜u) ≥ limu→0+G˜u(
1
2
)
≥ limu→0+
1
2
exp
(∫
a(x)>0
log
a(x) + u
2u
d(F (x))
)
= +∞.

Lemma 4.16. If ξ = 0, H < +∞, and G˜ < +∞, limu→(1/H)+ G˜u(t˜u) =
H exp
(∫
I
log a(x)d(F (x))
)
.
Proof. By definition, G˜ < +∞ implies that ∫a(x)>1 log a(x)d(F (x)) < +∞. From
Jensen’s inequality theorem, we have
+∞ > logH = log
∫
I
1
a(x)
d(F (x)) ≥
∫
I
log
1
a(x)
d(F (x)),
which implies that
∫
I
log a(x)d(F (x)) > −∞. Therefore, log a(x) is integrable.
It should be noted that limu→(1/H)+ t˜u = 1 (Lemma 3.11). Using the equalities
limu→(1/H)+ t˜u/u = H and limu→(1/H)+(1 − t˜u)u/t˜u = 0, we can choose 0 < δ <
min(1/H, E − 1/H), such that H/2 < t˜u/u < 3H/2 and (1 − t˜u)u/t˜u < 1/2 for
each u ∈ (1/H, 1/H + δ). Therefore, we have the following properties.
(1) If a(x) ≥ 1/2, then∣∣log (a(x)t˜u/u− t˜u + 1)∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣log t˜uu + log
(
a(x) +
(1− t˜u)u
t˜u
)∣∣∣∣∣
< max(
∣∣∣∣log H2
∣∣∣∣ , ∣∣∣∣log 3H2
∣∣∣∣) + log 2 + |log a(x)| .
(2) If a(x) < 1/2,∣∣log (a(x)t˜u/u− t˜u + 1)∣∣ < max(∣∣∣∣log H2
∣∣∣∣ , ∣∣∣∣log 3H2
∣∣∣∣) + |log a(x)| .
Using the above properties, we can apply Lebesgue theorem as follows:
lim
u→(1/H)+
G˜u(t˜u) = lim
u→(1/H)+
exp
(∫
I
log
(
a(x)t˜u/u− t˜u + 1
)
d(F (x))
)
= H exp
(∫
I
log a(x)d(F (x))
)
.

Lemma 4.17. If ξ = 0, H < +∞, and G˜ < +∞, limu→(1/H)− G˜u(1−) =
H exp
(∫
I log a(x)d(F (x))
)
.
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Proof. In the case in which ξ = 0, based on the definition which is mentioned
beneath the proof of Lemma 4.10, we have G˜u(1
−) = exp
(∫
I
log a(x)d(F (x))
)
/u.
Thus, we obtain the conclusion. 
Lemma 4.18. If ξ = 0, H < +∞, and G˜ < +∞, limu→0+ G˜u(1−) = +∞.
Proof. Due to Lemmas 4.11, 4.12, and 4.16, we haveH exp(
∫
I log a(x)d(F (x)))
> 1. Therefore, by the definition of G˜u(1
−) we obtain
lim
u→0+
G˜u(1
−) = lim
u→0+
exp
(∫
I
log a(x)d(F (x))
)
/u ≥ lim
u→0+
1/H/u = +∞.

Lemma 4.19. If ξ > 0 and Hξ = +∞, limu→ξ+ G˜u(t˜u) = +∞.
Proof. Lemma 4.12 ensures the existence of limu→ξ+ G˜u(t˜u), which is finite or
+∞. If a(x) > ξ, then (a(x) − ξ)/(2(u − ξ)) is strictly decreasing with respect to
u ∈ (ξ, E). Using Lebesgue theorem, we have
lim
u→ξ+
G˜u(t˜u) ≥ limu→ξ+G˜u(
u
2(u− ξ) )
≥ limu→ξ+
1
2
exp
(∫
a(x)>ξ
log
(
a(x) − ξ
2(u− ξ) +
1
2
)
d(F (x))
)
= +∞.

Lemma 4.20. If ξ > 0, Hξ < +∞, and G˜ < +∞, limu→(ξ+1/Hξ)+ G˜u(t˜u) =
Hξ exp(
∫
I
log (a(x) − ξ) d(F (x))).
Proof. An argument similar to that in the proof of Lemma 4.16 ensures that
log(a(x)− ξ) is integrable.
It should be noted that limu→(ξ+1/Hξ)+ t˜u = 1 + ξHξ (Lemma 3.9). From the
fact that limu→(ξ+1/Hξ)+ t˜u/u = Hξ and limu→(ξ+1/Hξ)+(ξt˜u − ut˜u + u)/t˜u = 0, we
can choose 0 < δ < min(ξ+1/Hξ, E − ξ− 1/Hξ), such that Hξ/2 < t˜u/u < 3Hξ/2
and (ξt˜u − ut˜u + u)/t˜u < 1/2 for each u ∈ (ξ + 1/Hξ, ξ + 1/Hξ + δ). Therefore, we
have the following properties.
(1) If a(x) ≥ ξ + 1/2,∣∣log (a(x)t˜u/u− t˜u + 1)∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣log t˜uu + log
(
a(x) − ξ + ξt˜u − ut˜u + u
t˜u
)∣∣∣∣∣
< max(
∣∣∣∣log Hξ2
∣∣∣∣ , ∣∣∣∣log 3Hξ2
∣∣∣∣) + log 2 + |log (a(x)− ξ)| .
(2) If a(x) < ξ + 1/2,∣∣log (a(x)t˜u/u− t˜u + 1)∣∣ < max(∣∣∣∣log Hξ2
∣∣∣∣ , ∣∣∣∣log 3Hξ2
∣∣∣∣) + |log (a(x)− ξ)| .
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Using the above properties, we can apply Lebesgue theorem as follows.
lim
u→(ξ+1/Hξ)+
G˜u(t˜u) = lim
u→(ξ+1/Hξ)+
exp
(∫
I
log
(
a(x)t˜u/u− t˜u + 1
)
d(F (x))
)
= Hξ exp
(∫
I
log(a(x) − ξ)d(F (x))
)
.

Lemma 4.21. If ξ > 0, G˜1/H(t˜1/H) = H exp
(∫
I log a(x)d(F (x))
)
.
Proof. It should be noted that 0 < ξ < 1/H < E and 1 < 1/H/(1/H − ξ). From
Lemma 3.8, we have t˜1/H = 1. Thus,
G˜1/H(t˜1/H) = exp
(∫
I
log (a(x)/(1/H)− 1 + 1) d(F (x))
)
= H exp
(∫
I
log a(x)d(F (x))
)
.

Lemma 4.22. If ξ > 0, limu→(1/H)− G˜u(1) = H exp
(∫
I
log a(x)d(F (x))
)
.
Proof. From 0 < ξ < u, we have 1 < u/(u− ξ). Thus, by Lemma 4.21 we obtain
lim
u→(1/H)−
G˜u(1) = G˜1/H(1) = H exp
(∫
I
log a(x)d(F (x))
)
.

If ξ > 0 and 0 < u ≤ ξ, a(x)t/u − t + 1 ≥ 1 for each t > 0. Therefore, we
can expand the definition of G˜u(t) = exp(
∫
I
log (a(x)t/u− t+ 1) d(F (x))), which
is greater than 1 and finite or +∞, in the domain 0 < u ≤ ξ and t > 0.
Lemma 4.23. If ξ > 0, limu→0+ G˜u(1) = +∞.
Proof. It should be noted that G˜1/H(t˜1/H) = H exp
(∫
I
log a(x)d(F (x))
)
> 1
(Lemma 4.21). From the expansion of G˜u(t) which is defined beneath the proof of
Lemma 4.22, we have
lim
u→0+
G˜u(1) = lim
u→0+
exp
(∫
I
log a(x)d(F (x))
)
/u ≥ lim
u→0+
1/H/u = +∞.

Lemma 4.24. If ξ < 0, ξ + 1/Hξ > 0 and G˜ < +∞, limu→(ξ+1/Hξ)+ G˜u(t˜u)
= Hξ exp
(∫
I log (a(x)− ξ) d(F (x))
)
.
Proof. It should be noted that Hξ < +∞ and limu→(ξ+1/Hξ)+ t˜u = 1 + ξHξ
(Lemma 3.10). The proof is formally the same as that of Lemma 4.20. 
Lemma 4.25. If ξ < 0, ξ + 1/Hξ > 0, and G˜ < +∞, limu→(ξ+1/Hξ)−
G˜u((u/(u− ξ))−) = Hξ exp
(∫
I log (a(x)− ξ) d(F (x))
)
.
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Proof. We obtain the conclusion using the definition which is mentioned beneath
the proof of Lemma 4.10. 
Lemma 4.26. If ξ < 0, ξ + 1/Hξ > 0, and G˜ < +∞, limu→0+ G˜u(u/(u − ξ)−)
= exp
(∫
I
log (a(x) − ξ) d(F (x))) /(−ξ).
Proof. We obtain the conclusion by applying the same process as in Lemma 4.25.

From Lemma 3.15, t˜u/u is strictly decreasing with respect to u ∈ (0, E), if
ξ + 1/Hξ ≤ 0. Therefore, limu→0+ t˜u/u exists, and we denote it by η > 0. From
0 < t˜u < u/(u− ξ), we have η ≤ −1/ξ.
Lemma 4.27. If ξ < 0 and ξ + 1/Hξ < 0, η < −1/ξ.
Proof. It should be noted that the definition wu(t˜u) = 0 implies that∫
I
1
a(x)
etu
u − t˜u + 1
d(F (x)) = 1.
From Lemma 3.12, we have limu→0+ t˜u = 0. Using Fatou’s lemma, we obtain∫
I
1
a(x)η + 1
d(F (x)) =
∫
I
limu→0+
1
a(x)
etu
u − t˜u + 1
d(F (x)) ≤ 1.
Assume that η = −1/ξ, we have∫
I
1
−a(x)/ξ + 1d(F (x)) = −ξHξ ≤ 1.
This implies that ξ + 1/Hξ ≥ 0, which is a contradiction. 
Lemma 4.28. If ξ < 0 and ξ + 1/Hξ = 0, η = −1/ξ.
Proof. Since Hξ < +∞, 1/(a(x)− ξ) is integrable. Thus, from
∫
I 1/(a(x)t˜u/u− t˜u
+1)d(F (x)) = 1 and by Lebesgue theorem, we have
∫
I 1/(a(x)η+1)d(F (x)) = 1. On
the other hand, it is clear that
∫
I
1/(a(x)×0+1)d(F (x)) = 1 and ∫
I
1/(a(x)(−1/ξ)
+1)d(F (x)) = −ξHξ = 1. This implies that the equation
∫
I
1/(a(x)y + 1)d(F (x))
= 0 with respect to y ∈ [0, −1/ξ] has three solutions y = 0, y = η, and y = −1/ξ.
Note that
∂2
∂y2
∫
I
1
a(x)y + 1
d(F (x)) =
∫
I
a(x)2
(a(x)y + 1)
3 d(F (x)) > 0.
Therefore, the equation
∫
I
1/(a(x)y + 1)d(F (x)) = 0 has at most two solutions.
This implies that η = −1/ξ. 
Lemma 4.29. If ξ < 0, ξ + 1/Hξ ≤ 0, and G˜ < +∞, limu→0+ G˜u(t˜u) =
exp
(∫
I log(a(x)η + 1)d(F (x))
)
.
Proof. Lemma 3.12 implies that limu→0+ t˜u = 0. From Lemma 3.15, t˜u/u is
strictly decreasing with respect to u ∈ (0, E). Due to Lemma 3.16, t˜u is strictly
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increasing with respect to u ∈ (0, umax). Therefore, if a(x) > 0 then a(x)etuu − t˜u+1
is strictly decreasing with respect to u ∈ (0, umax). This ensures that
lim
u→0+
∫
a(x)>0
log(
a(x)
u
t˜u− t˜u+1)d(F (x)) =
∫
a(x)>0
log(a(x)η+1)d(F (x)).
If Hξ < +∞, using Jensen’s inequality theorem, we see that log(a(x) − ξ) is
integrable. If a(x) ≤ 0 and 0 < u < min(−ξ, E), then we have
0 ≤ a(x) − ξ−2ξ ≤
a(x) − ξ
u− ξ < a(x)
t˜u
u
− t˜u + 1 < 1,
and ∣∣log (a(x)t˜u/u− t˜u + 1)∣∣ < |log (a(x)− ξ)|+ |log(−2ξ)| .
Therefore, we can apply Lebesgue theorem to the following equality.
lim
u→0+
∫
a(x)≤0
log(
a(x)
u
t˜u− t˜u+1)d(F (x)) =
∫
a(x)≤0
log(a(x)η+1)d(F (x)).
Thus, we accomplish
lim
u→0+
G˜u(t˜u) = exp
(∫
I
log(a(x)η + 1)d(F (x))
)
.
If Hξ = +∞, from Lemma 4.27, η < −1/ξ. If we assign ε := (ξη + 1) /2 > 0,
then, there exists δ > 0 such that t˜u < ε for each u ∈ (0, δ). Hence, if a(x) ≤ 0,
then we have
1 >
a(x)
u
t˜u − t˜u + 1 ≥ ξη − ε+ 1 = ε.
Thus, we can apply Lebesgue theorem in the domain { x | a(x) < 0 } and obtain
the conclusion. 
Here, we redefine η to be limu→0+ tu/u. If ξ < 0 and ξ + 1/Hξ > 0, by
the definition of tu, we have η = −1/ξ. Therefore, Lemma 4.26 implies that
limu→0+ G˜u(tu) = exp
(∫
I log (a(x)η + 1) d(F (x))
)
. Summing up the above-mentioned
Lemmas, we obtain the following
Theorem 4.1. If G˜ < +∞, G˜u(tu) is continuous and strictly decreasing with
respect to u ∈ (0, E). The range of G˜u(tu) is (1, +∞) (if ξ ≥ 0) or (1,
exp
(∫
I
log (a(x)η + 1) d(F (x))
)
) (if ξ < 0).
Afterward, we will show the equality G˜u(tu) = Gu(tu) (Theorem 5.1).
5. Double sequence of random variables
It should be noted that a series of step functions exists such that ξ ≤ fN(x)
≤ fN+1(x) ≤ a(x) and limN→+∞ fN (x) = a(x) for each x ∈ I, in which ξ =
infx∈I a(x) > −∞ is the essential infimum.
For example, for each positive integer N , assign M := 2NN + 1 and
fN (x) :=
{
aj := ξ +
j−1
2N , if ξ +
j−1
2N ≤ a(x) < ξ + j2N (1 ≤ j ≤M − 1),
aM := ξ +N, if a(x) ≥ ξ +N.
(12)
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In general, suppose {fN(x) | x ∈ I} = {aj | j = 1, ...,M}, where ξ = a1
< a2 < · · · < aM < +∞. Set pj :=
∫
aj≤a(x)<aj+1
d(F (x)) (1 ≤ j ≤ M − 1) and
pM :=
∫
a(x)≥aM
d(F (x)), then we have
∑M
j=1 pj = 1.
Assume u > 0, t ≥ 0, and ξt/u − t + 1 > 0. Then ajt/u − t + 1 > 0 for each
1 ≤ j ≤M . For the game {(aj , pj) | j = 1, 2, · · · ,M}, the growth rate per attempt
after n attempts is(
s∏
k=1
(ajk t/u− t+ 1)mjk
) 1
n
, (13)
where ajk occursmjk times (mj1+mj2+· · ·+mjs = n) with probability pmj1j1 · · · p
mjs
js
.
Such event has n! /(mj1 !mj2 ! · · ·mjs !) permutation patterns. We denote XN,n by
this random variable. Then, the expectation E[XN, n] is expressed as
∑
mj1+···+mjs=n
n!
mj1 ! · · ·mjs !
(
s∏
k=1
(ajkt/u− t+ 1)mjk
) 1
n
p
mj1
j1
· · · pmjsjs
(14)
=
 M∑
j=1
(ajt/u− t+ 1)
1
n pj
n
= exp

log
(
M∑
j=1
(ajt/u− t+ 1)
1
n pj
)
1
n
 .
Moreover, the variance V [XN,n] is expressed as
∑
mj1+···+mjs=n
n!
mj1 ! · · ·mjs !
(
s∏
k=1
(ajkt/u− t+ 1)mjk
) 2
n
p
mj1
j1
· · · pmjsjs
(15)
− E[XN,n]2
= exp

log
(
M∑
j=1
(ajt/u− t+ 1)
2
n pj
)
1
n

− exp

2 log
(
M∑
j=1
(ajt/u− t+ 1)
1
n pj
)
1
n
 .
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Lemma 5.1.
lim
N→+∞
(
lim
n→+∞
E[XN,n]
)
= exp
(∫
I
log (a(x)t/u− t+ 1) d(F (x))
)
.
Proof. If n approaches +∞, using L’Hopital’s theorem, we obtain
lim
n→+∞
E[XN,n] = lim
h→0+
exp

M∑
j=1
(ajt/u− t+ 1)h log (ajt/u− t+ 1) pj
M∑
j=1
(ajt/u− t+ 1)h pj

= exp
(∫
I
log (fN (x)t/u − t+ 1) d(F (x))
)
.
Since fN(x) ≤ fN+1(x) ≤ a(x), and limN→+∞ fN (x) = a(x), we obtain the
conclusion.

It is easily verified that if G˜ < +∞, limn→+∞ V [XN,n] = 0 for each N .
Lemma 5.2. If ν > 0, the following statements are equivalent.
(1)
∫
a(x)>1
a(x)νd(F (x)) < +∞.
(2)
∫
I
(a(x)t/u−t+1)νd(F (x)) < +∞ for each u > 0, t > 0, and ξt/u−t+1 > 0.
(3)
∫
I
(a(x)t1/u1 − t1 + 1)νd(F (x)) < +∞ for some u1 > 0, t1 > 0, and
ξt1/u1 − t1 + 1 > 0.
Proof. If a(x) > 2u/t × |1− t|, we have a(x) < 2u/t × (a(x)t/u − t + 1) and
a(x)t/u− t+ 1 < 2t/u× a(x). This implies the conclusion. 
We say that a game (a(x), F (x)) is effective when
∫
a(x)>1
a(x)νd(F (x)) < +∞
for some ν > 0, with the additional conditions E > 0 and ξ > −∞.
It should noted that for each 0 < ν < 1, there exists hν such that log(x + 1)
< hνx
ν for each x > 0.
Lemma 5.3. If a game is effective, G˜ < +∞.
Proof. If a(x) > 1 and 0 < ν < 1, we have log a(x) < hν(a(x) − 1)ν < hνa(x)ν .
If a(x) > 1 and ν ≥ 1, we have log a(x) < a(x) ≤ a(x)ν . Thus, we obtain the
conclusion. 
For example, the game (exp(1/
√
x), x) (x ∈ (0, 1]) is ineffective and G˜ < +∞.
Lemma 5.4. If a game is effective, limN→+∞ (limn→+∞ E[XN,n])
= limn→+∞ (limN→+∞E[XN,n]) = limn→+∞
N→+∞
E[XN,n] < +∞.
If a game is ineffective, limN→+∞E[XN,n] = +∞ for each n, if t > 0.
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Proof. For the assumption
∫
a(x)>1
a(x)νd(F (x)) < +∞, we can assume that ν < 1.
Suppose 0 < h < ν/2 and a(x) > u, we have∣∣∣∣ ∂∂h(a(x)t/u − t+ 1)h
∣∣∣∣ < (a(x)t/u− t+ 1)ν/2 log(a(x)t/u − t+ 1)
< hν/2(a(x)t/u − t+ 1)ν .
This guarantees that
∂
∂h
∫
I
(a(x)t/u− t+1)hd(F (x)) =
∫
I
∂
∂h
(a(x)t/u− t+1)hd(F (x)) < +∞.
Thus, since fN (x) ≤ fN+1(x) ≤ a(x), and limN→+∞ fN(x) = a(x), we have
lim
n→+∞
(
lim
N→+∞
E[XN,n]
)
= exp
(
lim
h→0+
∫
I(a(x)t/u − t+ 1)h log(a(x)t/u − t+ 1)d(F (x))∫
I(a(x)t/u− t+ 1)hd(F (x))
)
= exp
(∫
I
log (a(x)t/u− t+ 1) d(F (x))
)
< +∞.
Using Lemma 5.1, we have
lim
N→+∞
(
lim
n→+∞
E[XN,n]
)
= lim
n→+∞
(
lim
N→+∞
E[XN,n]
)
.
Set α := limN→+∞ (limn→+∞E[XN,n]) = limn→+∞ (limN→+∞ E[XN,n]), UN :=
limn→+∞E[XN,n], and Wn := limN→+∞E[XN,n]. Since fN(x) ≤ fN+1(x) ≤ a(x),
E[XN,n] increases with respect to N. By setting h := 1/n and applying L’Hopital’s
theorem twice, we have
lim
h→0+
∂
∂h
E[XN,n]
=
exp
(∫
I log(fN (x)t/u− t+ 1)d(F (x))
)
2
×( ∫
I
(log(fN (x)t/u− t+ 1))2 d(F (x))
− (∫I log(fN (x)t/u− t+ 1)d(F (x)))2
)
≥ 0.
This implies that E[XN,n] decreases with sufficiently large n. For ε > 0, there
exists N0 > 0 such that |UN − α| < ε for each N ≥ N0. Moreover, for ε > 0,
there exists N1 > 0 such that |Wn − α| < ε for each n ≥ N1. Therefore, we have
α− ε < UN ≤ E[XN,n] ≤Wn < α+ ε, which implies limn→+∞
N→+∞
E[XN,n] = α.
If
∫
a(x)>1 a(x)
νd(F (x)) = +∞ for each ν > 0, using Lemma 5.2, we have
lim
N→+∞
E[XN,n] = exp
 log
(∫
I(a(x)t/u − t+ 1)
1
n d(F (x))
)
1
n
 = +∞
for each n ≥ 1 and t > 0. 
Lemma 5.5. If a game is effective, limn→+∞
N→+∞
V [XN,n] = 0.
Proof. This can be proved in a manner similar to Lemma 5.4. 
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Lemma 5.6. If a game is effective,
lim
n→+∞
N→+∞
E[
(
XN,n − exp
(∫
I
log (a(x)t/u− t+ 1)d(F (x))
))2
] = 0.
Proof. The equality E[(XN,n − c)2] = V [XN,n]+(E[XN,n]− c)2 for each c implies
the conclusion (Lemmas 5.1, 5.4, and 5.5). 
We denote exp(
∫
I
log (a(x)t/u− t+ 1) d(F (x))) by Gu(t) for each u > 0, 0
≤ t ≤ 1, and ξt/u−t+1 > 0. We refer to this as the limit expectation of growth rate.
We adopt the criteria sup0≤t≤1, ξt−t+1>0 G1(t). In order to explain an advantage of
this criteria, we compare the following two games. After the consideration below,
it is reasonable for investors to prefer Game-2, which has the lower expectation
1.3125 (< 1.5) than that of Game-1.
Game-1. The profit 3 or 0 occurs with probability 0.5. In this case, we have
E = 1.5, max0≤t≤1, ξt−t+1>0 G1(t) =
√
9/8 ; 1.0607, and t˜1 = 0.25 (Example
6.3).
If the investors continue to invest all their current capital in Game-1 with
price 1, then, after 30 attempts they will be ruined with probability 1 − 0.530
; 0.99999999907.
If the investors continue to invest 0.25 of their current capital in Game-1 with
price 1, after 30 attempts their capital will increase by a factor of E[XN, 30] =
((3 × 0.25 + 0.75)1/30/2 + 0.751/30/2)30 ; 1.0628 (1.062830 ; 6.2165) with a small
variance V [XN, 30] ; 0.0045 for each N ≥ 3, where fN (x) is defined by (12).
Moreover, E[XN,n] < 1.0929 for each n ≥ 2 and N ≥ 3.
Game-2. The profit 2 or 0.625 occurs with probability 0.5. In this case, we have E
; 1.3125, max0≤t≤1, ξt−t+1>0 G1(t) =
√
121/96 ; 1.1227, and t˜1 = 5/6 ; 0.8333
(Example 6.3).
If the investors continue to invest 0.8333 of their current capital in Game-2
with price 1, after 30 attempts their capital will increase by a factor of E[XN, 30]
= ((2×0.8333+0.1667)1/30/2+(0.625×0.8333+0.1667)1/30/2)30 ; 1.1272 (1.127230
; 36.3103) with a small variance V [XN, 30] ; 0.0102 for each N ≥ 3, where fN(x)
is defined by (12). Moreover, E[XN,n] > 1.1227 for each n ≥ 2 and N ≥ 3.
In general, the asymptotic optimality principle states that any alternative is
dominated in the long run by the log-optimum strategy (Algoet and Cover (1988)).
However, it should be noted that, despite Lemma 5.1, when a game is ineffective,
the limit expectation of growth rate dose not have a solid significance as shown by
Lemma 5.4.
We say that tu is the optimal proportion of investment in order to continue to
invest without borrowing with respect to u > 0, if
lim ρ→tu
0≤ρ≤1
ξρ/u−ρ+1>0
∫
I
log
a(x)t/u− t+ 1
a(x)ρ/u− ρ+ 1d(F (x)) ≤ 0 (16)
for each 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 and ξt/u− t+1 > 0. It follows that 0 ≤ tu ≤ 1 and ξtu/u− tu+1
≥ 0.
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It is clear thatGu(t) = G˜u(t) on the intersection of domains. If limρ→t, 0≤ρ≤1, ξρ/u−ρ+1>0
Gu(t) exists, we extend Gu(t) by the value. Suppose G˜ < +∞, then, the equation
Gu(tu) = sup0≤t≤1, ξt/u−t+1>0Gu(t) implies that tu is the optimal proportion.
Theorem 5.1. tu = tu (u > 0), where tu is a continuous function defined by (7),
(8) and (9).
Proof. (1) If u ≥ E, tu = 0.
It should be noted that Lemmas 3.2, 3.3 and equality (10) are valid even if
u ≥ E. Using ∂wu(t)/∂t < 0 and wu(0+) = E/u − 1 ≤ 0, we have wu(t) < 0 for
each 0 < t < min(1, u/(u− ξ)). Therefore, we have∫ t
ρ
wu(t)dt =
∫
I
log
a(x)t− ut+ u
a(x)ρ− uρ+ ud(F (x)) < 0
for each 0 < ρ < t < min(1, u/(u − ξ)). This implies that tu = 0. The uniqueness
of tu can be easily verified.
(2) If ξ ≤ 0 and 0 < u ≤ ξ + 1/Hξ, tu = u/(u− ξ).
As shown in (1), it is sufficient to show that
∫ t
ρ wu(t)dt < 0 for each 0 < t
< ρ < u/(u − ξ). It is clear that 0 < Hξ < +∞. Using wu(u/(u − ξ)−) =
(1− ξ/u)Hξ(ξ+1/Hξ−u) ≥ 0 (Lemma 3.4) and ∂wu(t)/∂t < 0, we have wu(t) > 0
for each 0 < t < u/(u− ξ). Thus, we obtain the conclusion.
(3) If ξ > 0 and ξ < u ≤ ξ + 1/Hξ, tu = 1.
Since u/(u − ξ) > 1, we can show that ∫ t
ρ
wu(t)dt < 0 for each 0 < t < ρ < 1
as shown in (2).
(4) If ξ > 0 and ξ + 1/Hξ < u ≤ 1/H , tu = 1.
From Lemmas 3.6 and 3.8, we have t˜u ≥ 1 for each u ∈ (ξ + 1/Hξ, 1/H ].
Therefore, from wu(t˜u) = 0 and Lemma 3.2, we have wu(t) > 0 for each 0 < t < 1.
Thus, we obtain the conclusion as shown in (3).
(5) If ξ > 0 and 0 < u ≤ ξ, tu = 1.
From u ≤ ξ ≤ a(x), we have 1 ≤ a(x)t/u − t + 1 ≤ a(x)ρ/u − ρ + 1 for each
0 < t < ρ < 1. Therefore,
∫
I log((a(x)t/u− t+ 1) /(a(x)ρ/u− ρ+ 1))d(F (x)) ≤ 0,
which implies tu = 1.
(6) If ξ > 0 and 1/H < u < E, tu = t˜u.
It should be noted that u/(u− ξ) > 1. It is sufficient to show that ∫ tetu wu(t)dt
< 0 for each 0 < t < 1. From Lemmas 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8, we have 0 < t˜u < 1.
Moreover, from wu(t˜u) = 0, we have wu(t) > 0 for each 0 < t < t˜u and wu(t) < 0
for each t˜u < t < 1. Therefore, we obtain the conclusion.
(7) If ξ ≤ 0 and max(0, ξ + 1/Hξ) < u < E, tu = t˜u.
It should be noted that u/(u− ξ) ≤ 1. It is sufficient to show that ∫ tetu wu(t)dt
< 0 for each 0 < t < u/(u − ξ). From Lemmas 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4, we have 0 < t˜u
< u/(u− ξ). Thus, we obtain the conclusion as shown in (6). 
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Hereafter, we assume that G˜ < +∞. Thus, it is easy to verify the following
corollaries.
Corollary 5.1. Suppose ξ ≥ 0 and 1/H < u < E, or ξ < 0 and max(0,
ξ + 1/Hξ) < u < E. Then, the optimal proportion of investment tu is uniquely
determined by
∫
I(a(x)−u)/(a(x)tu−utu+u)d(F (x)) = 0, and the maximized limit
expectation of the growth rate is exp
(∫
I log (a(x)tu/u− tu + 1)d(F (x))
)
.
Corollary 5.2. Suppose ξ < 0 and 0 < u ≤ ξ+1/Hξ. Then, the optimal proportion
of investment is u/(u− ξ), and the maximized limit expectation of the growth rate
is exp(
∫
I
log(a(x) − ξ)d(F (x)))/(u − ξ).
Corollary 5.3. Suppose ξ ≥ 0 and 0 < u ≤ 1/H. Then, the optimal proportion of
investment is 1, and the maximized limit expectation of the growth rate is exp(
∫
I log a(x)
d(F (x)))/u.
Corollary 5.4. Suppose u ≥ E. Then, the optimal proportion of investment is 0,
and the maximized limit expectation of the growth rate is 1.
6. Game pricing
In order to determine the price u of the game, we require the riskless (simple
or continuously compounded) interest rate r > 0 for a period. If ξ ≥ 0 and G˜
< +∞, the solution of the equation Gu(tu) = r + 1 (if r is simple) or Gu(tu)
= er (if r is continuously compounded) is uniquely determined (Theorems 4.1 and
5.1). In particular, if u ∈ (1/H , E), tu is uniquely determined by the equation∫
I(a(x) − u)/(a(x)tu − utu + u)d(F (x)) = 0 (Corollary 5.1). If ξ < 0, G˜ < +∞
and exp
(∫
I
log (a(x)η + 1) d(F (x))
)
> r + 1 (or er), the solution of the equation
Gu(tu) = r + 1 (or e
r) is uniquely determined (Theorems 4.1 and 5.1).
In this section we assume that r = 0.04. It is easy to verify that the following
examples are effective games (Lemma 5.3).
Example 6.1. Suppose that the profit and distribution functions are given by
a(x) = x and F (x) = x ∈ I = [0, 1] respectively, then ξ = 0, E = 1/2, and
H = +∞. Set y = tu/u (0 < u < 1/2), then the equation wu(tu) = 0 can
be reduced to
∫
I
1/(xy −tu + 1)dx = 1. This integral equation has the solution
tu = (e
y − y − 1)/(ey − 1). Therefore, we obtain
Gu(tu) =
y
ey − 1 exp
(
y − 1 + y
ey − 1
)
,
which strictly increases from 1 to +∞ with respect to y ∈ (0, +∞). The price u
should be the solution of the equation Gu(tu) = 1.04 (if r = 0.04 is simple). Thus,
the price is u ; 0.4195, where tu ; 0.4118 (y ; 0.9818).
It should be noted that the equation E/u = 1.04 implies the (higher) price
u ; 0.4808 (> 0.4195), where tu ; 0.1109 and Gu(tu) ; 1.0022 (< 1.04).
Example 6.2. Suppose that the profit a or b (a > 1 > b) occurs with probability
p or q = 1 − p, respectively. Further assume that 1/H < u = 1 < E (if b > 0) or
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u = 1 < E (if b ≤ 0). Then, from (a−u)p/(atu−utu+u)+(b−u)q/(btu−utu+u) = 0,
we obtain
t1 =
q
1− a +
p
1− b (Kelly (1956)), (17)
G1(t1) = (a− b)
(
q
a− 1
)q (
p
1− b
)p
.
Samuelson (1971) deals with the case in which a = 2.7, b = 0.3, and p = q = 0.5,
where ξ = 0.3, E = 1.5, 1/H = 0.54 and t1 = 50/119 ; 0.4202. However,
Samuelson (1971) may have misinterpreted the criterion to be the geometric mean
2.70.50.30.5 = 0.9 < 1, instead of G1(t1) = (2.7 − 0.3)(0.5/1.7)0.5(0.5/0.7)0.5 ;
1.1000 > 1.
When u ; 1.1704, we have tu ; 0.2898 and Gu(tu) = 1.04.
It should be noted that the equation E/u = 1.04 implies the (higher) price
u ; 1.4423 (> 1.1704), where tu ; 0.0579, and Gu(tu) ; 1.0012 (< 1.04).
Example 6.3. In order to obtain the optimal proportions (t, s) of two independent
games (a(x), F (x)) and (b(x), G(x)) with the same price u > 0, we should find the
supremum of the function
exp
(∫
J
∫
I
log ((a(x)t+ b(y)s)/u− t− s+ 1)d(F (x))d(G(y))
)
, (18)
where t ≥ 0, s ≥ 0, s+ t ≤ 1, and (ξat+ ξbs)/u− t− s+ 1 > 0. It should be noted
that ξa (or ξb) is the essential infimum of a(x) (or b(x)).
In Section 5, we introduced the following two games:
Game-1. The profit 3 or 0 occurs with probability 0.5. In this case, we have E
= 1.5, ξ = 0, max0≤t≤1, ξt−t+1>0 G1(t) =
√
9/8 ; 1.0607, and t1 = 0.25. When
u ; 1.0880, we have tu ; 0.2155 and Gu(tu) = 1.04.
Game-2. The profit 2 or 0.625 occurs with probability 0.5. In this case, we
have E = 1.3125, ξ = 0.625, max0≤t≤1, ξt−t+1>0 G1(t) =
√
121/96 ; 1.1227, and
t1 = 5/6 ; 0.8333. When u ; 1.1237, we have tu ; 0.4856 and Gu(tu) = 1.04.
If the same price is u = 1, the limit expectation of growth rate is given by
exp
((
log(3t+ 2s− t− s+ 1) + log(3t+ 0.625s− t− s+ 1)
+ log(2s− t− s+ 1) + log(0.625s− t− s+ 1)
)
/4
)
.
This function attains the maximum value 1.1798 at t ; 0.2142 and s ; 0.7809.
If the same price is u ; 1.8153, the maximized limit expectation of growth rate
is r + 1 = 1.04 at t ; 0.1683 and s ; 0.3175.
Example 6.4. In the St. Petersburg game (Bernoulli(1738; English trans. 1954)),
suppose that the profit 2j occurs with probability 1/2j (j = 1, 2, · · · .), then ξ = 2,
E = +∞, and H = 1/3. This game is effective, because ∑∞j=1(2j)1/2/2j < +∞.
From Lemma 4.21 we haveG1/H(t1/H) = 1/3× exp(
∑∞
j=1(log 2
j)/2j) = 4/3. Thus,
Gu(tu) (u ∈ (3, +∞)) strictly decreases from 4/3 to 1. The equation Gu(tu) = 1.04
yields the price u ; 5.1052. Therefore, if the investors invest tu ; 0.1658 of their
current capital, they can maximize the limit expectation of growth rate to 1.04.
It should be noted that the equation E/u = 1.04 has no solution.
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Example 6.5. The lognormal distributed game is given by
a(x) = Serex, d(F (x)) =
1√
2piσ
e−
(x+σ2/2)2
2σ2 dx, (19)
and I = (−∞,+∞). In this case, we have E = Ser, H = (e−r+σ2)/S, and
exp
(∫
I
log a(x)d(F (x))
)
= Ser−σ
2/2.
When S = 100, σ = 0.3, and r = 0.04, we have ξ = 0, E ; 104.0811, H
; 0.0105125, and 1/H ; 95.1230. From Lemma 4.16, Gu(tu) (u ∈ (1/H, E))
strictly decreases from H exp
(∫
I
log a(x)d(F (x))
)
= eσ
2/2 ; 1.0460 to 1. The
equation Gu(tu) = e
0.04 ; 1.0408 yields the price u ; 95.6132. Therefore, if the
investors invest tu ; 0.9450 of their current capital, then they can maximize the
limit expectation of growth rate to e0.04.
It is clear that the equation E/u = er yields the (higher) price u = 100 (>
95.6132). Under this price, if the investors invest tu ; 0.4433 of their current
capital, they can maximize the limit expectation of growth rate to 1.0088 (< e0.04
; 1.0408). Because exp(r − σ2/2) ; 0.9950 (< 1.0088), the statement that the
expected growth rate is equal to r−σ2/2 (Luenberger (1998) 15.5) is not necessarily
true.
Example 6.6. The European put option is given by
a(x) = max(K − SerT ex, 0), d(F (x)) = 1√
2piTσ
e−
(x+σ2T/2)2
2σ2T dx, (20)
and I = (−∞,+∞). We assume that the stock price Y = SerT eX is lognormally
distributed with volatility σ
√
T , where S is the current stock price, r is the continuously
compounded interest rate, K is the exercise price of the put option, and T is the
exercise period. The expectation E is given by
E =
1√
2piTσ
∫ log KS −rT
−∞
(K − SerT ex)e− (x+σ
2T/2)2
2σ2T dx (21)
= KN
(
− log
S
K + (r − σ
2
2 )T
σ
√
T
)
− SerTN
(
− log
S
K + (r +
σ2
2 )T
σ
√
T
)
,
where N(x) =
∫ x
−∞
e−x
2/2/
√
2pidx is the cumulative standard normal distribution
function.
When S = 90, K = 120, T = 2, σ = 0.1, and r = 0.04, we have ξ = 0, E
; 22.9848, and H = +∞. Therefore, from Theorems 4.1 and 5.1, Gu(tu) (u ∈ (0,
E)) strictly decreases from +∞ to 1. The equations wu(tu) = 0 and Gu(tu) = e0.08
yield the price u ; 17.8157. With this price, if investors continue to invest tu
; 0.5434 of their current capital, they can maximize the limit expectation of growth
rate to e0.08 ; 1.0833.
In general, the equation E/u = erT yields the price
u = Ke−rTN
(
− log
S
K + (r − σ
2
2 )T
σ
√
T
)
− SN
(
− log
S
K + (r +
σ2
2 )T
σ
√
T
)
,
(22)
which is the Black-Scholes formula for a European put option. Substituting the
above-mentioned values for this formula, we obtain the (higher) price u ; 21.2176
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(> 17.8157). With this price, if the investors continue to invest tu ; 0.2278 of their
current capital, they can maximize the limit expectation of growth rate to 1.0096
(< 1.0833).
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